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ABSTRACT 
 
There is a growing consensus that effective Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) policies, 
aimed at supporting long-term national structural transformation, are a crucial element in helping 
latecomer countries escape from the middle-income trap. Citing cases of Northeast Asian catch-up 
and Latin American middle-income traps, scholars emphasize that the key to catch-up is a triple-
helix coordination that is used to transform foreign technology into indigenous technological 
capabilities. Thus, ideally, the expansion of the global production network, as promoted by the 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), provides opportunities for middle-income ASEAN countries to 
implement this technology-driven industrial catch-up strategy. This paper investigates three middle-
income ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia) to argue that the AEC, as an open 
market-led economic regionalism scheme, does not have the ability to create a strong sense of 
urgency on the part of national governments to alter their national STI policy directions. As 
resource-abundant countries, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia have yet to find any urgent need to 
prioritize the upgrading of indigenous manufacturing over natural resource-based technological 
developments. For these three countries, the AEC amplifies the need to compete against other ASEAN 
member countries instead pushing them to pursue industrial catch-up collectively. 
 
Keywords: economic regionalism, STI, industrial catch-up, ASEAN 
 
Dalam studi mengenai negara berkembang, terdapat sebuah konsesus bahwa peran kebijakan iptek 
dan inovasi memiliki peran crusial bagi kemampuan sebuah negara berkembang untuk lepas dari 
jebakan pendapatan menengah. Berbagai kajian, yang mayoritas didasarkan pada keberhasilan 
kasus negara-negara Asia Timur dan kegagalan kasus negara-negara Amerika Latin, 
telahmenekankan bahwa kunci dari keberhasilan proses catch-up adalah adanya efektifitas 
kerjasama triple-helix dalam proses pengembangan teknologi asing untuk mendukung 
pengembangan kemampuan teknologi lokal. Dalam kerangka ini maka, idealnya kerangka 
Masyarakat Ekonomi ASEAN (MEA) memberikan peluang yang besar bagi negara-negara 
berpendapatan menengah di ASEAN untuk dapat mengimplementasika strategi “technology-driven 
industrial catch-up”. Artikel ini menginvestigasi tiga kasus negara berpendapatan menengah di 
ASEAN (Malaysia, Thailand, dan Indonesia) untuk berargumen bahwa MEA, sebagai sebuah 
skema regionalism ekonomi yang berpusatkan pada pasar, tidak mampu menciptakan tekanan 
atau urgensi yang kuat bagi pemerintah nasional untuk mengubah arah kebijakan iptek dan 
inovasi. Sebagai negara yang kaya akan sumber daya alam, Malaysia, Thailand, dan Indonesia 
belum dihadapkan pada level urgensi yang tinggi untuk memprioritaskan upgrading sektor 
manfaktur lokal diatas perkembangan teknologi yang didasarkan pada pengembangan sumber 
daya alam. Bagi ketiga negara tersebut, MEA memperkuat persaingan diantara negara-negara 
anggota ASEAN daripada memprioritaskan kebutuhan untuk bekerjasama untuk mendorong 
industrial catch-up secara kolektif. 
 
Kata Kunci: regionalisme ekonomi, STI, industrial catch-up, ASEAN 
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Introduction 
 
One of the continuous challenges for developing countries is to avoid the middle-income trap 
(see Fig. 1). There are two general approaches to the middle-income trap(Paus, 2018). The 
neoclassical economic approach seeks to find a universal determinant for economic 
slowdowns.The structural-evolutionary economic approach focuses on the nature of the 
productive structure of the economy and technological learning process within the context of 
international competitiveness. Upgrading indigenous manufacturing has become the 
principle focus of the structural and evolutionary economic approach. Within the past 40 
years, the transitions of developing countries into countries with higher income levels have 
been accompanied by technological upgrades within the manufacturing subsectors1(United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2015). The successful catching-up 
experiences of some developmental states (e.g., Japan, Taiwan, South Korea) and the slower 
development of Latin American countries (e.g., Argentina, Brazil) have also led to a scholarly 
consensus on the importance of upgrading indigenous manufacturing (Fig. 1).Within this 
context, the national Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) policies of the latecomer 
countries have received abundant attention from scholars. Technology is not free and 
knowledge is imperfect, thus the latecomers governments need to invest in “some adaptive 
engineering in order to make foreign technology work” in the globalization era (Amsden, 
2001, p. 14). Triple-helix coordination (government-university-industry) becomes a crucial 
element in fostering technology  transfer from advanced countries to developing countries 
(i.e., a technology-driven industrial catch-up) (Lee, 2013; Taylor, 2016; United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization, 2015; OECD, 2018). 
 
Figure 1. Middle Income Trap: Relative 
Income 1950 and 2016 (selected countries) 
Figure 2. FDI Inflows into ASEAN-6 (1975-
2015), except Brunei Darussalam 
  
Source: Maddison Project Database (Bolt, 
et al., 2018) 
Source:(World Development Indicators, 
2019) 
 
Southeast Asian countries hold strategic positions in the middle of the global production 
network (global value chain). Since the 1980s, the manufacturing sector in these countries, 
particularly the middle-income ASEANcountries (i.e., Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia2), 
have been benefiting from the expansion of multinational companies (MNCs) from 
Northeast Asian countries (e.g., Japan, Taiwan, South Korea) (see Fig. 2 and Fig. 3). Since 
                                                 
1 See OECD (2011) for the manufacturing subsector classification based on technological levels. 
2 Yet, based on the relative income calculation, these three countries remain stuck in the middle-
income trap (Fig. 1). 
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2007, ASEAN has been building an economic regionalism framework (i.e., the ASEAN 
Economic Community or AEC) with the global production network expansion at its center.3 
Figure 3 shows that, since 1990, the manufactured exports from ASEAN countries have been 
benefiting from the global value chain expansion. The share of foreign value added remained 
large in 2013, particularly within its medium-technology manufacturing subsectors (e.g., 
electronics, automotive). In addition, based on various STI indicators provided by prominent 
reports,4 the larger middle-income ASEAN countries (i.e., Malaysia, Thailand, and 
Indonesia) continue to have weaker technological capabilities than the advanced countries, 
including ASEAN. 
 
Figure 3.  Share of Foreign Value Added (FVA) and Domestic Value Added (DVA) in Value 
Added Export from ASEAN (Manufacturing Subsectors) 
 
 
Source: ASEAN-Japan Center‟s Database on Global Value Chain (ASEAN-Japan Centre, 
2018) 
 
Therefore, the question is how can such a situation be explained? Overall, this paper argues 
that the AEC, as an open market-led economic regionalism scheme, cannot create a sense of 
urgency on the part of national governments to pursue a technology-driven industrial catch-
up, in sharp contrast to the Northeast Asian developmental states (Section 2.b.). As the AEC 
scheme continues to smooth the expansion of  the global production network into ASEAN 
countries, as it has since 2007, three middle-income ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Thailand, 
and Indonesia) have yet to alter their prioritizations of resource-based economic planning 
(i.e., the path-dependent nature of  their economic systems) and their resource-centric 
national STI policies (e.g., energy efficiency, climate issues, agricultural and food sectors). 
The AEC scheme actually amplifies the competition among ASEAN member countries rather 
than producing the collective will to pursue catch-up to the technologically advanced 
countries (i.e., the ASEAN external partners).  
 
Connecting Economic Regionalism and National Science, Technology, and 
Innovation Policies 
 
                                                 
3 At that time, the main concern was supporting regional economic recovery in the aftermath of the 
1997/98 Asian Financial Crisis (ASEAN, 2008). 
4 Various STI reports, such as the OECD STI Outlook 2016, present some of the latest STI 
developments in these three countries by evaluating an index of the capacity to innovate (e.g., gross 
domestic expenditure on R&D, education expenditure) (OECD, 2016a). 
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In an era of global production networks driven by MNCs, indigenous latecomer 
manufacturing firms are exposed to more opportunities to increase their technological 
capabilities through subcontracting schemes. However, as technological spillover is not an 
automatic process, an active role on the part of a national innovation system in latecomer 
countries through a national STI policy is necessary in order to help their indigenous 
manufacturing firms develop foreign technology. At the middle-income level, a country can 
no longer rely on low-technology specialization due to its inability to generate higher 
incomes. Latin American countries which are either trapped in the middle-income trap or 
have become economic basket cases represent examples of national governments that chose 
to rely on foreign technology (Amsden, 2001; Lee, 2013). Ideally, a form of open market-led 
economic regionalism facilitating foreign direct investment (FDI) for developing countries 
can provide more opportunities for national governments to increase their national 
technological capabilities as a foundation for a sustained economic growth. The two 
following subsections seek to discuss the flaws in this logic. 
 
a.Market-Led Economic Regionalism and the Risk of a Passive FDI-Dependent Strategy  
 
The discussion of economic regionalism is deeply intertwined with the globalization study, 
particularly the economic interpretation of globalization. Following Bisley(2007), in general, 
scholars of globalization study can be categorized into three groups based on how they assess 
globalization‟s fundamental characteristics: the economic interpretation, the sociological 
transformation, and the political conceptions. Writings on globalization first emerged in late 
1980s, which mostly about pattern of social life. In early 1990s, it started to manifest in form 
of global economic system and slowly provokes debate about the role of state (e.g. 
sovereignty, nationalism). Among this dynamics, the mid-1990s saw the emergence of an 
anti-globalization stance as scholars began to highlight the negative cost of globalization 
process (Bisley, 2007, pp. 13-15).  
 
Essential feature of globalization is mostly about economic interpretation of globalization. 
Bisley (2007), referring to Bhagwati‟s definition, puts it as an integration process of national 
economies into the international economy through channels such as trade, FDI, short-term 
capital flows, flows of workers or human resources, and flows of technology (p. 19). One of 
the continuing debates within the global economic system isthe North-South gap that 
continues to exist (or even grows wider). Most of the critiques based its stance on the 
problematic global economic system that favors the advanced economies and their MNCs, in 
which if “other things being equal, the fast growth of the rich should slow and the slow 
growth of the poor should accelerate as it takes advantage of the technology already created 
by the rich” (Thompson & Reuveny, 2010, p. 60).Technological innovation within 
manufacturing sectors is the essential element for economic convergences, where the North 
grows to be more technologically complex while the South struggles to emulate that complex 
technology (Thompson & Reuveny, 2010, p. 57). Instead of repeating the same debate over 
the „unfairness‟ aspect of the global economic system, this paper seeks to investigates how 
developing economies (national government) react or behave toward the opportunities 
within the global economic system.  
 
Economic regionalism framework, such as AEC, provides opportunities for national 
government to pursue industrial catch-up strategy particularly through indigenous 
manufacturing sector development (United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 
2015). The three middle-income ASEAN countries currently holds strategic positions in the 
global production network, which is the basis of AEC framework. The question is, how far it 
provokes national governments to maximize this opportunity?Unlike the European Union 
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(EU), a form of old or closed regionalism5(Haas, 1961; Balassa, 1961), ASEAN chose to form 
an open market-led economic regionalism though the AEC (Chaisse & Gugler, 2010; 
Plummer & Chia, 2015). ASEAN was established to maintain regional peace in the face of 
inter-state tensions and to contain the spread of communism during the Cold War (Tarling, 
2006; Beeson, 2009; Weatherbee, 2015). Hence, ASEAN has used a consensus-based 
decision-making principlesince its inception in 1967 (ASEAN, 2019b). The1997/98 Asian 
Financial Crisis strengthened the importance of FDI from outside ASEAN (mainly from 
Japan) and resulted in an ASEAN Plus Three6arrangement in 1999 and the Chiang Mai 
Initiative in 2000. They finally agreed on the AEC Blueprint in 2007 (Plummer & Chia, 2015; 
Soesastro, 2005). 
 
There remains a risk that a passive, FDI-dependent policy might follow. Such a passive, 
outward-looking, FDI-dependent strategy often underestimates the difficulties of 
internalizing technological spillovers (Narula & Dunning, 2010, p. 272). Thus, it leads to 
difficulties in terms of upgrade manufacturing capabilities (Lall & Narula, 2004, p. 461). As 
argued by Fu, Pietrobelli, and Soete (2011), “without proactive indigenous innovation efforts, 
foreign technology remains only static technology embedded in imported machines which 
will never turn into real indigenous technological capabilities” (p. 1210). Capabilities 
convergence matters more than income convergence in terms of middle-income countries 
escaping from the middle income trap. A country can fall into the middle-income trap when 
it “can no longer compete internationally in standardized, labor-intensive commodities 
because wages are relatively too high, but it can also not compete in higher value-added 
activities on a broad enough scale because productivity is relatively too low” (Paus, 2018, p. 
65). National government support of indigenous manufacturing technological capabilities 
matters.  
 
b. The Origin of Technology-Driven Industrial Catch-Upand the Problem of Path-
Dependence  
 
The current momentum regarding national STI policy as a part of an industrial catch-up 
strategy originated mostly from successful Northeast Asian catch-up experiences (e.g., 
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea)7and assigns national governments to be the main actors. A 
triple-helix cooperation (government-university-industry) is the key in technological 
dissemination to support the upgrading of indigenous manufacturing sectors. Since the mid-
1970s, South Korea and Taiwan have been relying on government-funded research institutes 
to disseminate technology to private indigenous manufacturing firms (Shin, et al., 2012; Lee, 
2013; Taylor, 2016). In addition, there is  a lesson learned from the failure of Latin America 
(e.g., the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis) in terms of the problem of overreliance over primary 
product (Gereffi & Wyman, 1990; Kharas & Kohli, 2011). Lee (2013)suggests that a resource-
based development strategy (e.g., biotechnology) only provides small windows of 
opportunities due to the risk of resource unsustainability and high competition, making it a 
high-technology replication strategy due to high-income countries‟ technological domination  
(p. 129). 
 
The problem, however, is that this catch-up strategy was constructed from the experiences of 
natural resource-scarce countries (e.g., Japan, South Korea), which, during their initial 
catch-up stage were exposed to specific vulnerabilities, such as regional security threats, that 
were translated into a higher level of urgency on the part of national governments to follow 
such strategies (Doner, Ritchie, & Slater, 2005; Ohno, 2018). Not only does that same 
vulnerability not exist for the three middle-income ASEAN countries, but an evaluation of 
                                                 
5Within an old/closed regionalism, the basic objective is to construct a regional economic bloc to 
protect its member countries against non-member countries(Hettne & Söderbaum, 2000). 
6 ASEAN Plus Three includes ASEAN member countries and Japan, South Korea, and China. 
7 See Lundvall and Borrás (2005) 
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the national STI policies of the three countries (Section 4) highlights how these three 
countries exhibit the path-dependence problem as natural resource-abundant countries 
(David, 1994; Martin & Sunley, 2006; Rypestøl, 2017). Governments in natural resource-
abundant countries tend to place natural resource development at the center of their 
national economic development strategies (i.e., agriculture, resource-based industry, bio-
technology) unless there is a disruption on this strategy.  
 
 
Evaluating the ASEAN Economic Community and Its STI Development Schemes 
 
Since its inception, the AEC main framework has sought to facilitate the global production 
network expansion into ASEAN countries, as presented in its first blueprint in 2007 (Fig. 4), 
which covered largely the harmonization of regional trade regulations. In 2015, ASEAN 
released a new AEC Blueprint that emphasizes indigenous industrial development. It 
contains five AEC characteristics (Fig. 5), and its second characteristic, Characteristics B, 
encompasses most of ASEAN‟s efforts to support industrial competitiveness in order to move 
up the GVC (pp. 12-21). The STI development schemes are the main strategy listed for 
Productivity-driven Growth, Innovation, Research and Development, and Technology 
Commercialization (i.e. Characteristic B, Element 4). 
 
Figure 4. ASEAN Economic Community 1st Blueprint (2007) 
 
 
Source: drawn by author based on 1st  AEC Blueprint (2008) 
 
Figure 5. ASEAN Economic Community 2nd Blueprint (2015) 
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Source: drawn by author based on 2nd AEC Blueprint (2015) 
 
In their second blueprint, ASEAN acknowledges “the critical role of technology adaptation 
and diffusion, as well as innovation in ASEAN‟s productivity growth and long-term 
competitiveness” as an important factor in pushing its member countries to improve their 
innovation and technological capabilities (ASEAN, 2015, p. 16). ASEAN understands that 
ASEAN member countries face challenges such as weak investments in R&D activities, weak 
human capital development, and technology diffusion problems. Thus, ASEAN established a 
regional-level framework for STI cooperation to facilitate the manufacturing sector 
upgrading (i.e., move up the GVC). The AEC Consolidated Strategic Action Plan 2018 
stresses ten STI objectives to be achieved by 2025, which includes increasing triple-helix 
cooperation, technology transfer and technology development between local and foreign-
owned firms, support for small and medium enterprises‟ (SMEs‟) STI development, and 
industrial cluster development to support technology linkages within the GVC (ASEAN, 
2018, pp. 17-19). 
 
With regards to AEC, the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) constitute the main decision-
making forum. However, the sectoral body in charge of STI development is the Committee 
on Science and Technology (COST), which works under the guideline of the ASEAN Plan of 
Action on Science, Technology, and Innovation (APASTI) 2016-2025. The origin of APASTI 
itself goes back to 1970s, more than 30 years before the first AEC blueprint. APASTI‟s initial 
focus was more on human resource development and natural resource efficiency through STI 
development (ASEAN, 2017a).After the 10th ASEAN Summit, through the Vientiane Action 
Program 2004-2010, ASEAN acknowledged the importance of STI development in terms of 
enhancing ASEAN‟s economic competitiveness and sustaining economic growth. Thus, 
under the AEC schemes, APASTI began to promote an incorporation of STI development 
into national economic and industrial planning8 (ASEAN, 2017b, p. 5). 
 
Table 1. Actions for Strategic Thrust 1 & 3 of APASTI 2016-2025 
                                                 
8 Aside than AEC, STI development programs under APASTI also become part of ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community, with an emphasis over human development (e.g. mobility of scientist and 
researcher, scholarship and fellowship grants) (ASEAN, 2017a, p. 6). 
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Source: (ASEAN, 2017b) summarized by author 
 
The APASTI 2016-2025 Implementation Plan includes two strategic thrusts that connect 
directly to indigenous industrial competitiveness (i.e., Thrust 1 and Thrust 39) (Table 1) 
(ASEAN, 2017b, p. 3). Under APASTI and other COST projects, ASEAN completed a series of 
STI projects.10 Table 2 shows that, between 2007 and 2016, most ASEAN STI projects were 
related to energy, climate and disaster management, and space technology (a total of 52 
projects). Training and student exchanges also received a lot of attention (26 projects). Two 
of the latest STI projects, started in 2016, are related to climate change issues. In sum, at the 
implementation level, there is lack of technological development for manufacturing sector. 
 
Table 2. Summary of ASEAN STI Projects as reported by APASTI 2016-2025 
 
 
Notes: compiled and categorized by author based on project titles and the area of work of the 
ASEAN sub-committee in charge of each project 
Source:(ASEAN, 2017a, pp. 20-27) 
 
                                                 
9 Thrust 3 is more about small and medium enterprises (SMEs) because the majority of indigenous 
firms in ASEAN are SMEs (see Fig 6). 
10 In addition to STI projects, ASEAN also funded 21 other activities with the ASEAN Science Fund, 
mostly related to constructing action plans.  
Thrust 1 
“Public-Private Collaboration” 
Thrust 2 
“Enterprises Support” 
Actions 
1. Intensify the engagement of 
academe, private sector and relevant 
partners in the planning, 
implementation and assessment of 
joint undertakings in human 
resource development, and research 
and development. 
2. Enhance and sustain the utilization 
of the ASEAN Science and 
Technology Network (ASTNET) and 
strengthen other S&T networks to 
facilitate information sharing. 
3. Establish policy frameworks 
including IPR protection, risk and 
benefit sharing mechanisms for joint 
collaboration and technology 
transfer among centers of excellence. 
4. Strengthen existing regional STI 
initiatives in priority areas including 
Sustainable Development Goals. 
Actions 
1. Establish support mechanism such 
as mentorship and incentive 
program to support and nurture STI 
enterprises from start-up to the next 
competitive level of development. 
2. Engage dialogue and other strategic 
partners in joint undertakings on 
appropriate and commercially viable 
STI initiatives. 
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Aside from APASTI 2016-2025, ASEAN‟s efforts in supporting indigenous manufacturing 
upgrading in its member countries can also be seen in the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation 
(AICO) scheme and ASEAN Strategic Action Plan for SME Development 2016-2025. The 
AICO scheme, signed in 1996, was the main industrial cooperation scheme for all of the 
manufacturing sectors under the ASEAN Free Trade Area (1992). The AICO scheme offered 
incentives and tariff privileges (0-5%) for participating firms. As of 2005, almost all of the 
129 approved AICO applications came from MNC‟s subsidiaries and Original Equipment 
Manufacturing (OEM) firms (ASEAN, 2012). The AICO scheme ended in 2011. 
 
Figure 6. SMEs in ASEAN 
 
 
Source: re-drawn by author (ASEAN, 2015b, p. 1) 
 
The ASEAN scheme to support STI for SMEs is another important element because the 
majority of indigenous firms in ASEAN countries are micro or SMEs (Fig. 6). Within their 
Strategic Action Plan for SME development, ASEAN acknowledged the importance of the 
SME-MNC linkage (ASEAN, 2015b, pp. 8-9). The main program used to support SME‟s 
access to technology and innovation since 2013 is called the “Business and Technology 
Incubator,” which was proposed by Indonesia (ASEAN Cooperation Project, 2013). Its 
technology business incubator TBI) arm aims to promote technology-based start-ups11 
(Table 3) (ASEAN Cooperation Project, 2013, p. 1). Table 3 shows that while most of the 
ASEAN TBI start-ups, particularly from Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, are in 
agriculture, bio-technology, and information and communication technology (ICT) (Table 3), 
Japan has been chosen as the model TBI country. The six Japanese research institutions 
(i.e., TBI start-ups from Japan) are all involved in high technology (advanced) research and 
development (e.g., machinery and electronics, IT, Augmented Reality technology for 
smartphones) (ASEAN Cooperation Project, 2013, p. 56). 
 
Table 3. Technology Business Incubator Respondents from Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia 
                                                 
11Under the ASEAN Connectivity 2025 Master Plan scheme, ASEAN has a project called “Digital 
Innovation,” which focuses on SME digitalization rather than technology development or R&D activity 
for SMEs. 
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Source: summarized by author (ASEAN Cooperation Project, 2013) 
 
Since 2007, the AEC has always been about the manufacturing sector. While the first 
blueprint was mainly about trade regulation in terms of facilitating global production 
expansion into ASEAN countries, the second blueprint sought to facilitate indigenous 
manufacturing development through an incorporation of STI development schemes. 
However, at the implementation level, most of the STI cooperation projects continue to be 
based on the idea of a „resource-based development through technology‟ instead of 
„technology development‟ to support upgrading the manufacturing sector in addition to ICT 
development. In the next section, this paper seeks to show that such priorities are in line 
with national STI policies in Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. 
 
Evaluating and Discussing the National STI Policies of Malaysia, Thailand, and 
Indonesia under AEC Implementation 
 
AEC‟s facilitation of GVC expansion into ASEAN countries has not been followed by 
increasing efforts in terms of manufacturing technology cooperation among ASEAN 
countries. Through an examination of official government documents (Table 4), this section 
highlights that: (1) the national governments‟ concerns over AEC mostly involve competing 
against other ASEAN countries for FDI instead of industrial catch-up, (2) under the AEC 
regime (since 2007), national STI policies have continued to be linked tightly with natural 
resource development objectives (e.g., agricultural technology, biotechnology, environment 
protection, or climate technology), and (3) within the era of industry 4.0, the industry 4.0. 
policy plans from all three countries led to their prioritization of the „adoption of industry 
4.0‟ instead of „indigenous manufacturing technology‟ development. Therefore, the main 
problem is not the lack of governments‟ efforts to boost STI capabilities but rather how they 
perceive the function of national STI policies. 
Institution Name Activity Focus 
Malaysia  
1. Malaysia Technology Development 
Corporation Sdn Bhd Technology Center 
ICT (48%), biotech (29%), life science 
(5%), food science (2%), electronic and 
electrical (5%), automotive (1%), others 
(7%) 
2. Innovation Incubation Center – Technology 
Park Malaysia Corporation Sdn Bhn 
IT, biotech 
3. SIRIM Technology Incubation Center General, first metal, ceramics, 
chemicals, biotech, ICT 
Thailand  
1. Sripatum University-Business Incubator 
private 
General: handicraft, agriculture, digital 
media 
2. Business Incubator Center (Thai Software 
Park) & NSTDA Business Incubator 
ICT (software) and technology-based 
enterprises (biotech, material 
technology, nanotech, electronics and 
computer technology) 
4. Mae Jo University Business Incubator Agriculture and food 
5. Far Eastern University Business Incubator Handicraft, Tourism, IT 
Indonesia  
1. Incubie, Bogor Agricultural University Agriculture, creative business 
2. Technology Incubator Center, Agency for the 
Assessment and Application of Technology 
IT, biotech, nanotech, manufacturing, 
software industry 
3. Bandung Digital Valley IT 
4. Merah Putih Incubator ICT technology (online internet start-
up, social media, mobile app, games)  
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Table 4. Key Government Documents and Key STI Actors 
 
 
Notes: An overview of STI policy in Malaysia and Thailand can be found respectively on the 
report by OECD(2016b) and UNCTAD(2015). There are more STI agents (institutions) 
existed on Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, however, table 4 only present a list of main 
key actors who are involved in the STI strategy planning. 
Source: author 
 
a. Malaysia:Gap between National STI Policy and National Industrial Development 
Strategy 
 
Among the three countries, Malaysia currently has the highest economic growth 
performance, highest share of medium-high technology activities in total manufacturing 
value added,12 and highest innovation performance.13The government of Malaysia 
                                                 
12 Based on the Competitive Industrial Performance Index 2018, the share of medium-high technology 
activities in total manufacturing value added in Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia in 2016, 
respectively, were 44.1 percent, 40.7 percent, and 25.1 percent. Their compositions of manufacturing 
exports show that more than 20 percent of Malaysia and Thailand‟s manufacturing exports are 
resource-based, while more than 40 percent of Indonesia‟s manufacturing exports are resource-based 
(UNIDO, 2018). 
 Malaysia Thailand Indonesia 
Main 
National 
Development 
Plan 
documents 
Malaysia Plan (MP): 
9th MP (2006-2010); 
10th MP (2011-2015); 
11th MP (2016-2020); 
11th MP (2016-2020) 
Mid Term Review 
1. National Economic 
and Social 
Development Plan 
(NESDP): 
10th NESDP (2007-
2011); 11th NESDP (2012-
2016); 12th NESDP 
(2017-2021) 
2. National Strategic 
Plan 2018-2037 
1. Long-Term 
National 
Development Plan 
2005-2025 
2. Short-Term 
National 
Development Plan: 
2010-2014 Short-Term 
Plan; 2015-2019 Short-
Term Plan 
Key STI 
Actors 
1. (From 2004) 
Ministry of Science, 
Technology, and 
Innovation / MOSTI 
(From 2018) 
Ministry of Energy, 
Science, Technology, 
Environment and 
Climate Change / 
MESTECC 
2. (From 1884) Science 
Advisor and (From 
1993) Malaysian 
Industry-
Government Group 
for High-Technology 
3. (From 2010) 
National Innovation 
Agency of Malaysia 
4. (From 2016) 
National Science 
Council 
1. National Science, 
Technology, and 
Innovation Committee 
(including Prime 
Ministers and various 
ministries) 
2. National 
Research Council of 
Thailand 
3.  Ministry of 
Science and 
Technology / MOST: 
§ National Science 
and Technology 
Development 
Agency / NSTDA (in 
charge of four high-
technology centers 
& innovation 
scheme such as 
Industrial 
Technology 
Assistance) 
§ (From 2005) 
National Science, 
Technology, and 
Innovation Policy 
Office 
4.  Agriculture 
Research and 
Development Agency 
(under Ministry of 
Agriculture and 
Cooperative) 
5. Office of the 
Higher Education 
Commission 
(university-based 
research) 
1. Commission VII of 
House of 
Representative of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
2. National Research 
Council 
3. Ministry of Research, 
Technology, and 
Higher Education: 
§ University-based 
Center of 
Excellence  
§ National Science 
and Technology 
Park 
4. Non-departmental 
government agencies 
under co-ordination 
with Ministry of 
Research, 
Technology, and 
Higher Education 
(e.g. Agency for the 
Assessment and 
Application of 
Technology; 
Indonesian Institutes 
of Sciences; National 
Nuclear Energy 
Agency; National 
Institute of 
Aeronautics and 
Space) 
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acknowledges the importance of the manufacturing sector for their economic growth. 
However, the MNCs have remained to be the main drivers. Their national STI policy is still 
tightly linked to natural resource technology development. The story of Malaysia‟s 
manufacturing growth goes back to the 1970s and the Mahathir‟s New Economic Policy. 
When Mahathir stepped down from politics in 2006, the government of Malaysia shifted 
their priorities into the agricultural sector and resource-based industries. When he came 
back into Malaysian politics in 2018, the government of Malaysia reconstructed their 
national economic strategy by emphasizing the manufacturing sector. Interestingly, they also 
decided to combine the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation with the Green 
Technology and Energy Components from the Ministry of Energy, Green Technology, and 
Water and related components in Climate Change and Environment under the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment to form the Ministry of Energy, Science, Technology, 
Environment, and Climate Change (MESTECC). 
 
From the 1970s to 2006, the government of Malaysia made a decision to abandon their 
agricultural sector in favor of a modern economic sector through the adoption of New 
Economic Policy and the 2nd Malaysia Plan (1971-1975), which were provoked by the 1969 
Riots.14 The main objective in fostering structural change was to reduce the economic 
disparities between ethnicities that had become a primary threat to the nation‟s future(The 
Economic Planning Unit of Malaysia, 1971, p. 1).As a consequence, the government of 
Malaysia decided to rely heavily on FDIs instead of nurturing domestic capital, such as that 
for Chinese Malay businesses. This decision led to a slower pace of indigenous technology 
development, particularly among the smaller Chinese Malaysian-owned firms (Ritchie, 
2005). 
 
Starting in 2006, the government of Malaysia constructed their national economic strategy 
around agricultural development. They stated that it was “the third engine of economic 
growth” and that Malaysia “must think progressively and remove misperceptions that 
agriculture is a low value added economic activity capable of only generating small incomes” 
(The Economic Planning Unit of Malaysia, 2006, pp. 16-17). The government increased its 
spending on the agricultural sector by 70 percent from the previous plan (i.e., the Eight 
Malaysia Plan 2001-2005) (The Economic Planning Unit of Malaysia, 2006, p. 18). The 
Tenth Malaysian Plan (2011-2015) emphasized the problem of the middle-income trap, but 
the government continued their resource-based prioritization, as they established 12 
potential National Key Economic Areas: 1. Oil and gas; 2. Palm oil and related products; 3. 
Financial services; 4. Wholesale and retail; 5. Tourism; 6. ICT; 7. Education; 8. Electrical and 
electronics;15 9. Business services; 10. Private healthcare; 11. Agriculture; and 12. Greater 
Kuala Lumpur(The Economic Planning Unit of Malaysia, 2010, p. 122). In addition, instead 
of attempting to catch up with the technologically advanced countries, the government of 
Malaysia continued to compete for FDI “not just against countries in the immediate region, 
but against those in South America and Eastern Europe”(The Economic Planning Unit of 
Malaysia, 2010, p. 2). 
 
The Tenth Malaysian Plan and Eleventh Malaysian Plan (2016-2020) also 
addressed/address SME development, particularly opportunities that come from the AEC 
scheme.  However, there are no mechanisms to support indigenous manufacturing 
                                                                                                                                                        
13 One of the indicators is innovation index such as Global Innovation Index. In 2018, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Indonesia ranked 35th, 44th, and 85th respectively (Cornell University; INSEAD; WIPO, 
2018). 
14 The root of the riots was the economic disparities between ethnicities in Malaysia, in particular 
between the Bumiputera and the Chinese Malaysians. These riots were the key economic historical 
event leading to the future Malaysian high economic growth performance (Jomo, 2004; Ritchie, 
2005; Andaya & Andaya, 2001).  
15 There is a lack of concreate planning to support foreign technological learning (The Economic 
Planning Unit of Malaysia, 2010, p. 131). 
Adiasri Putri Purbantina 
Global & Policy Vol.7, No.2, Juli-Desember 2019 170 
technology development (i.e., technology dissemination through triple-helix coordination). 
The government aims to support MNC and SME partnerships to intensify export promotion 
(market access) (The Economic Planning Unit of Malaysia, 2015, pp. 8-21), which represents 
a passive FDI-dependent strategy. Furthermore, the industrial strategy presented in the 
Tenth Malaysian Plan mostly involves the low-technology industry and service sectors (Table 
5). 
 
Table 5. Modern Services Subsectors as Presented on the Eleventh Malaysia Plan 
 
Source: (The Economic Planning Unit of Malaysia, 2015, pp. 8-19) 
 
Prior to the government change in 2018, the Ministry of Science, Technology, and 
Innovation (MOSTI) was the main agent responsible for the national STI policy (Fig. 7). 
Based on the National Policy on Science, Technology, and Innovation (Ministry of Science, 
Technology, and Innovation of Malaysia, 2016) and the Strategic Plan of the Ministry of 
Science, Technology, and Innovation 2016-2020 (Ministry of Science, Technology, and 
Innovation of Malaysia, 2017), the National Science Research Council mostly prioritized a 
resource-centric sector (Fig. 8) (Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation of 
Malaysia, 2017, p. 9). MOSTI transformed into MESTECC in 2018 when Mahathir returned 
to Malaysian politic as its seventh prime minister. They renewed their national economic 
strategy16 in the Mid-Term Review of the Eleventh Malaysia Plan 2016-2020: New Priorities 
and Emphases (The Economic Planning Unit of Malaysia, 2018). However, there is no trace 
of a mechanism to support indigenous manufacturing technology development within its five 
main elements, which were developed “to move up the value chain”(The Economic Planning 
Unit of Malaysia, 2018, p. 19) 
 
Figure 7. Institutional Structure Supporting 
Innovation and R&D Activities in Malaysia 
before 2018 
Figure 8. Projects Funded by the 
Malaysian Technology Development 
Corporation Categorized by Its 
Technology Clusters 2016-2018 
 
                                                 
16 Due to the corruption 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal involving the incumbent 
political coalitions, the revised Eleventh Malaysia Plan emphasizes government (public sector) 
transparency. In 2015, news broke that about US$ 700 million was allegedly moved from the 1MDB 
project into Prime Minister Najib‟s personal bank account (Reuters, 2018).  
Sub-sector Description 
Halal Industry Develop halal industry by linking Malaysian halal standards to 
international standards and promote the alternative ingredients 
industry. 
Islamic Finance Reinforce Malaysia’s position as a global Islamic finance marketplace 
through innovative Islamic financial products and services. 
ICT Improve exports of ICT products and services by developing ICT 
technology focus areas, infusing ICT in other sectors and strengthening 
ICT industry support ecosystem. 
Oil & Gas Services Develop Malaysia as an oil and gas hub in the Asia Pacific region 
through strengthening upstream capability and improve collaboration 
between industry and higher learning institutions. 
Private 
Healthcare 
Grow healthcare travel through international accreditation, increased 
insurance coverage, and leverage regional referral network. 
Private Higher 
Education 
Continue to develop reputable and high-quality private higher 
education institutions through ratings and quality assessments and 
self-regulation incentives. 
Ecotourism Position Malaysia as a premier ecotourism destination by leveraging 
biodiversity assets and increased branding and promotion. 
Professional 
Services 
Promote Malaysia as an outsourcing center for professional services to 
increase exports through capacity building. 
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Source: (The Economic Planning Unit of 
Malaysia, 2010, p. 85) 
Source: (Portal Data Terbuka Malaysia, 
Goverment of Malaysia, 2018) 
The National Policy on Industry 4.0, released in 2018, does acknowledge the challenges of 
AEC‟s GVC expansion scheme for the indigenous manufacturing sector, which contains 98.5 
percent SMEs (Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Malaysia, 2018, pp. 27-28). 
The policy‟s strategy is called F.I.R.S.T (i.e., Funding, Infrastructure, Regulations, Skills and 
Talent, and Technology). MESTECC is mainly responsible for Malaysia‟s technology strategy 
(Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Malaysia, 2018, p. 66). However, MESTECC 
priorities consist mostly of green technology, energy efficiency, and environmental issues 
(Table 6). Meanwhile, the electrical and electronic equipment is the sector with the highest 
share of value added in ASEAN (see Fig 3) and employs 25 percent of the Malaysian 
manufacturing sector workforce (Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Malaysia, 
2018, p. 25). 
 
Table 6. MESTECC‟s Focusses 
 
Source: (Ministry of Energy, Science, Technology, Environment, and Climate Change of 
Malaysia, 2019a) 
 
MESTECC offers two types of R&D funding schemes. The first scheme is for SMEs and is 
called the MESTECC R&D Fund. This fund prioritizes three research areas: (1) Water, Food, 
and Energy; (2) Green Growth for Sustainable Development; and (3) Medical and 
Healthcare (Ministry of Energy, Science, Technology, Environment, and Climate Change of 
Malaysia, 2019b). The second scheme is the International Collaboration Fund (for 
Government Research Institutions, Government STI Agencies, and Public and Private 
Institutions of Higher Learning (IHLs) with accredited research programs), which prioritizes 
five research areas: (1) Biotechnology; (2) Engineering and Technology; (3) Computer 
Science and ICT; (4) Medical and Health Sciences; and (5) Agriculture and Forestry 
(Ministry of Energy, Science, Technology, Environment, and Climate Change of Malaysia, 
2018). Overall, the Malaysian national STI policy still bounded to natural-resource 
technology development instead of prioritizing indigenous manufacturing technology 
development as part of an industrial catch-up strategy. 
Biotechnology 
(agriculture, 
industrial, 
healthcare)
33%
Healthcare, Cosmetic
11%
Advanced material
6%
Food processing
5%
Environmental 
Sciences & 
Renewable Energy
6%
ICT
7%
Robotic 
2%
Machinery and 
Equipment. 
11%
Industry Advanced 
Manufacturing; Industrial 
Technology; Manufacturing; 
Medical Device; Electric and 
Electronic
19%
1. Green and 
Efficient Energy 
Sector 
• To increase the percentage from 2% to 20% of renewable energy 
for electricity generation 
• To improve the national energy efficiency 
• To improve the efficiency and transparency of the energy 
market to ensure the best tariffs for energy consumers 
2. Environmental 
Pollution-free and 
Resistance to 
Climate Change 
• Leading the country towards a free non-biodegradable plastic 
• To reduce pollution through education and enforcement 
• To prepare country to address climate change through 
adaptation and mitigation 
3. Wealth 
Creation Through 
Science and 
Technology 
• Demand-driven R&D through close collaboration with the 
industry 
• To increase technology commercialization into marketplace 
• To increase industrial productivity through science & 
technology applications 
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b.Thailand: Agriculture-Oriented National STI Policy 
 
Since Thailand‟s inception as a modern state in 1932, the agricultural sector has played an 
important part in Thailand‟s economy due to its political clout.17 The Thaksin administration 
(2001-2006) represented the first and only period in which the government of Thailand 
pursued industrial catch-up under a long-term industrial policy. Thaksin ultimately failed to 
build a broad political coalition to support his policy (Doner, et al., 2009; Intarakumnerd, 
2011). After his administration ended, the government of Thailand constructed a national 
economic strategy around a self-sufficiency philosophy,18 in which the national STI policy 
sought to develop agriculture, energy and resource efficiency, and a green economy. 
Thailand continued to rely mostly on technology lending, as the majority of its workforce was 
still in low-technology sectors and mostly the agricultural sector (ADB, 2015, p. 19). 
 
Since 2007, four volumes of the National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP)19 
have placed a high priority on the agricultural development sector. It often emphasized that 
global environmental problems threaten their agricultural products, food security, and 
energy security (The Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board of 
Thailand, 2012, p. ii). The Twelfth NESDP (2017-2021) stated that the first sectoral priority 
of the national research agenda was food, agriculture, and the biotechnological industry (The 
Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board of Thailand, 2017, p. 18). 
The National Strategy 2018-2037 also re-confirms that the government of Thailand aims to 
increase national competitiveness through strategies based on agricultural value-added 
exploration, tourism diversification, and resource-based development (The Office of the 
National Economic and Social Development Board of Thailand, 2018, pp. 6-7).The eleventh 
NESDP states that in the wake of AEC, “the first priority for Thailand is to develop human 
resources, especially by upgrading education, linguistic, and labor skills”20 in addition to 
stating that “environmental management at the regional level will lead to a more sustainable 
use of natural resources in the region” (The Office of the National Economic and Social 
Development Board of Thailand, 2012, p. 4). Furthermore, the government of Thailand also 
seeks to “promote Thailand as a center for food processing within the forthcoming ASEAN 
Economic Community”21 (The Office of the National Economic and Social Development 
Board of Thailand, 2012, p. 64). Thailand‟s concern over agricultural sector competitiveness 
led to their concern over increasing competition from countries such as Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar, and Vietnam due to increasing liberalization under the AEC (The Office of the 
National Economic and Social Development Board of Thailand, 2017, p. 30). 
 
The National Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy and Plan 2012-2021 states that 
there are two main sectoral priorities: biotechnology and nanotechnology. Upon a closer 
look, the main goals of these two sectoral priorities are to support sufficiency in agriculture, 
resource efficiency, health, and environmental protection (National Science, Technology, 
and Innovation Policy Office of Thailand, 2019). The majority of the STI projects reported by 
the National Science and Technology Development Agency of Thailand in 2017 were natural 
resource-centric technology development projects (Table 7). In 2018, the government of 
Thailand released Thailand 4.0 as their national strategy to “unlock the country from a 
                                                 
17See Hewison (1989) and Phongpaichit and Baker (1995). 
18 It was initiated as a strategy to cope with the aftermath of the 1997/98 Asian Financial Crisis. 
19 This paper investigates the tenth (2007), eleventh (2012), and twelfth (2017) National Economic 
and Social Development Plans. 
20 One of their missions is to prepare Thailand‟s workers for entering the ASEAN labor market (The 
Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board of Thailand, 2012, p. 97). 
21 In this regard, the government of Thailand seeks “to deal with fluctuation in price for agricultural 
products and to cope with shortages in energy and agricultural products due to the free flow of goods,” 
which requires public-private cooperation (The Office of the National Economic and Social 
Development Board of Thailand, 2012, p. 97). 
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middle-income trap” and “advance the country towards the first work country within the 
context of the 4th industrial revolution” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, 2018). 
However, the focus of the government of Thailand is more on digitalization and ICT (e.g., 
smart farming) instead of on developing indigenous manufacturing technology (Table 8). 
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Table 7. STI Projects in 2017 as Reported by NTSDA 
 
Source: (The National Science Technology Development Agency of Thailand, 2018, p. 8) 
 
Table 8.Selected Agendas of Thailand 4.0 and Its Targets Related to Industrial and STI 
Development and ASEAN Economic Community 
 
Source: (Royal Thai Embassy, Washington D.C. , 2019) 
 
c. Indonesia: The Agrarian and Maritime Competitive Advantage 
 
The agricultural sector has always been at the center of Indonesia‟s national development 
strategy. In addition to the agricultural sector, as an archipelago country, Indonesia also pays 
extra attention to their maritime sector (e.g., fisheries, maritime security). After the 1997/98 
Asian Financial Crisis, the government of Indonesia adopted a pro-poor approach by 
prioritizing the agricultural sector. The agricultural and maritime sectors hold important 
positions within the Indonesian STI policy, upon which the New Order era (1966-1998) left a 
strong legacy. A combination of these two sectors also extends into how the government 
perceives the AEC challenges, which amounts to a reaction fairly similar to Thailand‟s. 
 
Categories Programs (Outputs) 
Smart Farm nutritious and anti-oxidant rich Riceberry, flash-flooding tolerant 
Homcholasit rice for the community, diagnostic kits for shrimp 
diseases to minimize risk and increase farmers’ income, and Agri-
Map: a tool for agricultural management. 
Smart Food Dezigner-8: an innovative delivery system to enhance egg quality, 
low-fat frankfurter, and Active PAKTM fresh produce packaging. 
Smart Health Dentii Scan: a scanner for dental and maxillofacial structures, safety- 
enhanced ambulance cabin to save lives and medical equipment, and 
Thai School Lunch to help schools prepare lunch menus to meet 
nutritional requirements and available budget. 
Smart Energy nanomaterial coating and coating technique to enhance solar thermal 
energy efficiency. 
Smart Industry NETPIE: a platform to facilitate interconnecting IoT devices, and 
ENZease: a duo-activity enzyme for one-step biodesizing and 
bioscouring process of cotton fabric, 100% replacement of chemicals. 
Organization Agricultural Technology and Innovation Management Institute 
(AGRITEC), was founded under NSTDA, to facilitate the transfer of 
technologies to farmers. AGRITEC now works with 220 communities 
in 45 provinces, covering 36 key technologies. Some outstanding 
projects include organic rice cultivation in Yasothon province and 
greenhouse technology with photo selective plastic covering. 
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Since 2004, the Indonesian government have been promoting resource-based economic 
planning to pursue a “Maritime and Agrarian Competitive Advantage,” as stated in the 2005-
2025 Long-Term National Development Plan(Ministry of National Development Planning of 
the Republic of Indonesia, 2005). President Joko Widodo, since 2014, has constructed the 
Nawa Cita strategy using the same main idea. The Nawa Cita strategy, as presented in the 
2015-2019 Medium-Term National Development Plan, prioritizes agro-industry, wood and 
forestry, fisheries, and mining in order to accelerate national economic growth (Ministry of 
National Development Planning of the Republic of Indonesia, 2014a).With a maritime and 
agrarian focus, the Indonesian government emphasized the danger of a mass flow of foreign 
products into the Indonesian market when the AEC went into effect in 2016 harming local 
producers, particularly the agricultural sector and SMEs (Ministry of National Development 
Planning of the Republic of Indonesia, 2014b, p. 5.6). The government of Indonesia sought 
to push for Indonesian leadership in the regional maritime sector and connectivity (e.g., 
maritime security, maritime resources, maritime food security, maritime tourism, fisheries) 
(Ministry of National Development Planning of the Republic of Indonesia, 2014b, pp. 5.27-
2.28). 
 
In 2018, the Ministry of Industry release a new national industrial strategy called “Making 
Indonesia 4.0.” The ministry aims to promotes five main sectors: (1) Food and Beverages; (2) 
Textile and Clothes; (3) Automotive; (4) Chemical; and (5) Electronics. This short document 
shows that the government of Indonesia still continues to rely on MNCs (i.e., by offering tax 
incentives) to drive the medium-technology manufacturing sectors (i.e., automotive and 
electronics) (Ministry of Industry of the Republic of Indonesia, 2018, p. 7). Instead of aiming 
to be a champion for higher manufacturing sectors, the documents states that the 
government seeks to transform Indonesia into a powerhouse food and beverages industry in 
ASEAN and a world-class clothing producer (Ministry of Industry of the Republic of 
Indonesia, 2018, pp. 4-5). The industry 4.0. document discusses mostly digitalization and 
the implementation of industry 4.0. technologies instead of indigenous manufacturing 
technology development. 
 
Figure 9. Current Key STI Policy Agents in 
Indonesia 
 
Table 9. Indonesian National Research 
Priority Agenda (2015-2044) 
  
Notes: This figure is author‟s modification 
from Bishry and Hidayat (1998, p. 10) with 
adjustment based on (Ministry of Research 
Technology and Higher Education of the 
Republic of Indonesia, 2016a, p. 24) 
Source: author 
Notes: This priority rank refers to 
government‟s budget allocation (from first 
to sixth as follows: 40 per cent, 20 per 
cent, 15 per cent, 12.5 per cent, 7.5 per 
cent, and 5 per cent). 
Source: National Research Plan 2015-2045 
Version 3.5.2. (Ministry of Research 
Technology and Higher Education of the 
Republic of Indonesia, 2016a, p. 34) 
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It is important to acknowledge the legacy of the New Order era (1966-1998) within their STI 
policy, particularly in terms of strategic-defense technology. It gave birth to key STI policy 
agents in Indonesia (Fig. 8) such as the National Research Council and other STI 
development agencies22 (Bishry & Hidayat, 1998; Amir, 2013). Under B.J. Habibie‟s 
leadership, Indonesian science and technology policies pursued high-technology 
development, particularly aircraft development. After a regime change in 1998, and due to 
the impact of 1997/1998 Asian Financial Crisis on the domestic economy, the government of 
Indonesia ceased to pursue high-technology development and re-oriented the STI policy 
towards supporting agricultural technology development (Ministry of National Development 
Planning of the Republic of Indonesia, 2008). The STI agents from the New Order remained 
as key STI agents (Fig. 9). 
 
The National Research Plan 2015-2045 states that there are seven priority fields23on the 
Indonesian National Research and Technology Agenda: (1) Food Security; (2) Energy and 
New Energy; (3) Health and Medicine; (4) Transportation; (5) ICT; (6) Defense and Security 
Technology; and (7) Advanced Materials (Ministry of Research Technology and Higher 
Education of the Republic of Indonesia, 2016a, p. 39). Table 9 shows that the prioritization 
of resource-based industries continues. The National Research Plan 2015-2045, in 
particular, emphasizes the food and pharmacy industries, cosmetics, and the health 
equipment industry as priority industries that need support from technology 
development(Ministry of Research Technology and Higher Education of the Republic of 
Indonesia, 2016a, p. 26).  
 
The prioritization of resource-based technology development is also manifested in various 
STI policy programs implemented by the Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher 
Education of the Republic of Indonesia. The Ministry‟s annual reports in 2015 and 2016 
provided lists of regular STI policy programs and projects, which included a National Science 
and Technology Park (N-STP), Regional Innovation Cluster (RIC), Technology Business 
Incubator (TBI), and university-based Centers of Excellence (COEs).24 Most of the N-STP 
units, which are owned and operated by the Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher 
Education, conduct resource-based product development (e.g. sago, wood, coffee, fisheries). 
Various innovation clusters under RIC also deal with low-technology products (e.g., brown 
sugar, bananas, sweet potatoes, fisheries, crafts and woven products). The TBI program 
outputs presented on the two annual reports show that it mostly aims to increase resource-
based industry production capacities instead ofupgrading manufacturing (e.g., seaweed 
technology, electric stoves for Batik textiles, milk pasteurization, green bean technology, rice 
technology). Since 2014, out of a total of 45 COEs, only two units are conducting R&D in 
medium-technology development (i.e., automotive and electronics), and Bogor Agricultural 
University controls the majority of the COEs.The 2016 Performance Report of the Ministry 
of Research, Technology, and Higher Education provides a list of 45 industrial prototypes 
developed by various STI agents in Indonesia since 2014(Ministry of Research Technology 
and Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia, 2016b, pp. 121-124).Based on the list of 
industrial prototypes provided by the 2016 Performance Report of the Ministry of Research, 
Technology, and Higher Education, numerous industrial prototypes have been developed for 
strategic-defense purposes, including maritime radar, a water cannon, and an infrared 
                                                 
22 These agencies are Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT), Indonesian 
Institute of Sciences (LIPI), National Institute of Aeronautics and Space (LAPAN), National Nuclear 
Energy Agency of Indonesia (BATAN), Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN), Indonesian 
Aerospace. 
23 The 2017 version of this document included a maritime research, which mostly aims to develop a 
maritime economy, such as fisheries, bio-technology maritime, tourism, ships. (Ministry of Research 
Technology and Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia, 2017, pp. 73,76, 82).     
24 Indonesia is the initiator of the Technology Business Incubator program within ASEAN‟s STI 
development scheme for SMEs.  
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rocket(Ministry of Research Technology and Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia, 
2016b, pp. 128-152). 
 
d. Summarizing the National STI Policies of Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia Under the 
AEC Regime 
 
The AEC does not automatically translate into the pursuit of industrial catch-up. At in the 
case of these three middle-income ASEAN countries, their competitors are other latecomer 
countries (e.g., other ASEAN member countries) instead of advanced countries (e.g., 
ASEAN‟s external partners). A deeper examination of national STI policies shows that the 
national governments understand the importance of technology development by STI agents; 
however, as natural resource-abundance countries, their national STI policies do not reflect 
the idea of upgrading indigenous manufacturing subsectors. The national STI policies of 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia have always been intertwined tightly with natural 
resource-based technology development (e.g., agricultural development, energy efficiency). 
In the era of industry 4.0., the governments in these three countries have focused on 
digitalization and the implementation of industry 4.0. technologies instead of indigenous 
manufacturing technology development. The AEC (i.e., global production network 
expansion) does not induce any sense of strong urgency for these three middle-income 
ASEAN countries to alter their national STI policy directions and objectives (i.e., they are 
remaining path-dependent). Thus, these governments will be likely to continue to implement 
passive, FDI-dependent strategies. 
 
Table 10. Summary of Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia 
 
 
Source: Author 
Closing Remarks: Missing Opportunities and the Lack of Urgency 
 
As scholars demand efficient government policies (i.e., to increase indigenous technological 
capabilities as the foundation for structural transformation), they often neglect to realize 
that the national governments of these latecomer countries have different mindsets on how 
certain policies should function (i.e.,the path-dependence problem). There is a problem with 
assuming that all national governments are rational economic actors that will strategize to 
help the most effective sector (i.e., the manufacturing sector). The case of the three middle-
income ASEAN countries shows that “opportunity maximization” is not a strong enough 
motive to push national governments to alter their national STI policy directions. If scholars 
seek to place governments as the central actors in latecomer countries, then the largest 
obstacle for these resource-abundant, middle-income countries in terms of altering their 
economic development paths is the difficulty to alter the national strategy from resource-
 Malaysia Thailand Indonesia 
How the 
national 
development 
plan captures 
challenges from 
AEC 
Opportunities for 
manufacturing SMEs 
(but lack of 
exploration of the 
mechanism for 
indigenous 
manufacturing 
technology) 
Challenges for labor, 
increasing challenge 
for agricultural 
sector in terms of 
competitiveness 
from CLMV 
countries 
Challenges for labor, 
domestic market, 
investment and 
financial sectors, 
maritime sector 
The STI 
priorities since 
AEC 2007 
Agricultural 
modernization, bio-
technology, health, 
ICT, climate, and 
green growth 
 
Biotechnology and 
nanotechnology, 
with the main 
objective of 
enhancing the 
agricultural sector, 
environmental 
conservation, energy 
security 
Agricultural 
technology, food 
sector, maritime 
technology, 
strategic-defense 
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based strategies to technology-based strategies.With regards to ASEAN,the urgency in terms 
of pursuing industrial catch-up, both at the national level and collectively as a region, 
toshore up weak technological capabilities must be emphasized.  
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